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Some philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists, phenomenologists as well as Buddhist philosophers 
have claimed that an awareness of an object is not just an experience of that object but also involves 
self-awareness. It is sometimes argued that being aware of an object without being aware of oneself 
is pathological. As anyone who has been involved in martial arts, as well as any sports requiring 
quick responses such as cricket and tennis, can testify, however, awareness of the self at the time of 
acting becomes problematic: you would not be able to respond to the slight movement of your 
opponent if you were aware of yourself responding to it. This suggests that it must be possible for us 
to be aware without being aware of ourselves. The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of self-
awareness and its relation to the self by investigating the phenomenology of the martial artist who is 




Self-Awareness and Martial Arts 
 
Imagine that you are in the middle of a kendō or fencing match faced with an opponent. You see a 
slight movement in the tip of the opponent’s shinai or sabre. In that moment, if you took the brief 
time to think to yourself: “I see an opening, now is the time to counter-strike!'”, then it is likely that 
you would already be struck by the opponent before you can counter-strike. Given the speed of the 
opponent’s attack, you do not have the time to think what to do, and then respond. Your response 
must be instantaneous. However, if you do not think that it is the right moment, how can you even 
respond at all? How can you respond to the movement of your opponent without thinking? 
This koan-like question requires a careful analysis of actions. It requires us to investigate 
what makes it possible for us to act, and how an instantaneous response can be said to be our 
response, i.e., a response that we are responsible for.1 However, whatever we can say about actions 
in relation to our mental activity is also related to the issue of the state of our awareness. Before you 
can respond to the movement of your opponent, seeing the movement must be part of your 
experience in that moment. In order for this to be the case, an awareness of your opponent’s 
movement must also form part of your awareness. 
In recent years, some philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists and phenomenologists have 
advanced the thesis that an awareness of an object is not just an experience of that object but also 
involves self-awareness. The most sustained argument for the thesis has been provided by Damasio 
(2000). He has argued that every consciousness or every conscious experience comes with a ‘sense 
of self’. He writes: 
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You are looking at this page, the text and constructing the meaning of my words as you go 
along. But concern with text and meaning hardly describes all that goes on in your mind. In 
parallel with representing the printed words and displaying the conceptual knowledge 
required to understand what I wrote, your mind also displays something else, something 
sufficient to indicate, moment by moment, that you rather than anyone else are doing the 
reading and the understanding of the text. (p. 10) 
 
What characterises your conscious experience, according to Damasio, is the ‘presence of you in a 
particular relationship with some object’ (p. 10). By this, he is not advancing the Cartesian thought 
that, insofar as you are experiencing an object, you must be present in order to have that experience. 
That is, he is not advancing an ontological claim that there must be you when you experience an 
object. He means that, from the first-person perspective, there is you, or an appearance of you, in the 
awareness of object. In other words, Damasio’s claim is, I take it, a phenomenological one: when 
you are aware of an object, that awareness includes you. Damasio writes thus: 
 
The full scope of your mind is not confined to images of what is being perceived externally 
or of what is recalled relative to what is perceived. It also includes you. (p. 128) 
 
According to Damasio, it is, in fact, pathological to have an experience of an object (or objects 
arranged in a certain way) without having a sense of self. He cites the cases of epileptic automatism 
and akinetic mutism to show that it is pathological for the self not to be present in one’s conscious 
experience.2 
Now, from a Buddhist perspective, the notion of self-awareness that Damasio argues to be a 
necessary component of our conscious experience may be thought to be problematic given the 
Buddhists’ adherence to the no-self (anattā or anātman) doctrine. Moreover, if we thought that 
Buddhist doctrines inform (some forms of) martial arts, then the experiences of martial artists who 
have realised the no-self doctrine might be thought to be counter-examples to Damasio’s thesis that 
our awareness necessarily involves self-awareness.3 
The 16-17th century Zen Buddhist Takuan Sōhō might be thought to present such a sceptical 
stance towards self-awareness. In providing Zen teachings to some of the leading sword-masters of 
his time, he says that if you experience yourself responding to your opponent, then, in that very 
moment, your mind will be taken by the self of which you are aware. Then ‘you will lose your 
movements and you will be struck by your opponent’ (Mumyō Jūchi Bonnō in Fudōchishinmyōroku 
(The Record of Immovable Wisdom)).4 In responding to the opponent without delay, an awareness 
of the self ‘gets in the way’. According to Takuan, because of the awareness of yourself, you may 
respond to yourself counter-acting the opponent’s strike. But, in doing so, you may not respond to 
the opponent’s strike as such. Once you become aware of yourself, then the game is over. In fact, 
much of training in kendō consists of learning to force your opponent to become aware of 
themselves. Takuan describes the tactic of making the opponent become aware of the self as ‘Taking 
hold of the enemy’s spear and making it the instrument of your enemy’s own destruction’ (Mumyō 
Jūchi Bonnō). 
Takuan does not provide a detailed account of awareness that he thinks is problematic for 
martial artists. Prima facie, however, Damasio’s thesis about the necessity of self-awareness appears 
to be inconsistent with Takuan’s teaching. In responding to the opponent’s strike, the martial artists 
are told to be in a state where they themselves are no longer experienced and, thus, there is no self of 
which they are aware. If this is a rejection of self-awareness, then, according to Damasio, their 
experiences are said to be pathological or they can hardly be said to be conscious experiences. How 
would Takuan and other Buddhists respond to this? 
In this paper, I shall investigate the notions of self-awareness and no-self.5 I shall, in 
particular, present a discussion of the notions from Buddhist perspectives.6 As is evidenced by 
several Buddhist accounts of no-selfhood discussed in Siderits, Thompson and Zahavi (2011), there 
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is no unified doctrine of no-self that is endorsed by all Buddhists. Consequently, it is a matter of 
debate as to how best to understand Buddhist notions of no-self and which no-self doctrine is or 
should be applicable to the phenomenology of martial artists who are ‘in the act’. I shall consider 
two Buddhist no-self doctrines: the no-self doctrine that can be found in the Nikāyas (part of the Pāli 
canon) and another that is discussed by the thirteenth century Japanese Zen Buddhist Dōgen. By 
presenting an early development and a later development of Buddhist thought, I will show a change 
of focus in considering no-selfhood. Moreover, I will demonstrate that, while Nikāyas’ no-self 
doctrine is not applicable to martial artists, Dōgen’s account accurately describes the phenomenology 
of martial artists. I will also show that, once we understand Takuan’s teaching in terms of Dōgen’s 
account, then we can see that Damasio’s thesis does not contradict Takuan’s teaching. 
 
 
No-Self in the Nikāyas 
 
In the Nikāyas, the contents of experience are analysed in terms of five ‘aggregates’ (skandha 
(Sanskrit) or khandha (Pāli)): material matter (i.e., the object of experience), feeling, perception, 
volition and consciousness. These ‘aggregates’, in their particular forms, are thought to exhaustively 
constitute any particular experience. From an experiential point of view, there is nothing other than 
those aggregates that could constitute an experience. Importantly, it is denied that the self can be 
found in the bundle of the streams of conscious experiences. In the Nikāyas, the Buddha is depicted 
to have said: 
 
Material matter is nonself. ... Feeling is nonself. ... Perception is nonself. ... Volition is 
nonself. ... Consciousness is nonself. (Saṃyutta Nikāya 22.59)7 
 
In the Milindapañhā, an analysis of this kind is extended to a consideration of the aggregates 
collectively. In the famous (actual or otherwise) dialogue between King Milinda and the Buddhist 
monk Nāgasena, it is said that ‘the pole, the axle, the wheels, the body of the chariot, the flag-staff of 
the chariot, the yoke, the reins, the goad’ collectively are not the chariot.8 
According to the Nikāyas (and the Milindapañhā), there is nothing which forms one’s 
experience that can count as the self. But what exactly is the self that is said not to form experience? 
In the Sallekha Sutta contained in the Majjhima Nikāya, we find the following passage: 
 
[A]s to those various views that arise in the world associated either with doctrines of a self or 
with doctrines about the world: if [the object] in relation to which those views arise, which 
they underlie, and which they are exercised upon is seen as it actually is with proper wisdom 
thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self,’ then the abandoning and 
relinquishing of these views comes about. (Sallekha Sutta: 3)9 
 
The notion of selfhood which is denied in the Nikāyas seems to be something we construct in 
relation to what we experience. When I become aware of harsh words directed at me, for example, I 
may identify myself as someone who is described by those words. According to the Nikāyas, what I 
am doing when I make such an identification is that I am taking personal ownership of what those 
words describe; that is to say that those words become mine. It is not only the object of awareness 
(i.e., harsh words) that is taken as mine, but the whole experience consisting of those words and 
other aggregates such as feeling associated with them that may also be personally owned. As a result, 
that experience becomes identified as mine. The self, ‘mineness’, which arises from this process is, 
however, a construction. By making identification and taking personal ownership of the ‘image’ that 
I construct based on the harsh words, I identify myself with those words in my experience. It is this 
constructed self which is thought to arise as soon as we become aware of objects and other 
aggregates that is often described to be problematic in the Nikāyas.10 
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According to the Nikāyas, the identification of an object or an experience on the whole as me 
involves a creation of ‘me’ out of the fleeting streams of consciousness. Such identification involves 
a unification of the contents of consciousness at each moment. This unification gives rise to 
synchronic identity as me now. Unity created in identification also involves a projection of the self to 
the past and the future giving rise to diachronic identity. The contents of consciousness across times 
are unified and given diachronic identity. But, the synchronic and diachronic self created in this way 
assumes more stability and continuity than the fleeting nature of the streams of consciousness can 
warrant.11 Hence, so the argument goes, the self that is created to form one’s experience is only an 
appearance. The no-self view expressed in the Nikāyas is that there is nothing in consciousness 
which corresponds to any attribute that the self is said to have. 
Now, in responding instantaneously to the movement of the opponent, it is problematic for 
martial artists to treat an experience as mine and constructing a fictional entity, i.e., a self, of which 
they become aware at the time of responding. However, is the awareness of a fictional self 
problematic for the martial artists because it is an awareness of something which, in fact, does not 
exist? It is certainly the case that thinking of something as existing while it in fact does not is 
epistemically problematic. Yet, is there anything problematic about the awareness of a fictional self 
specifically in the context of responding instantaneously? 
The answer seems to be no. In fact, the no-self view described above does not seem to be 
applicable to the experience of martial artists. On that view, a construction of a self is made possible 
by identifying experiences as mine. This means that there is, in fact, nothing personal about the 
streams of consciousness. However, in order for me to respond to the opponent’s movement, an 
experience of seeing the movement must already be my experience before the identification. For my 
immediate response to be possible, the content of that experience must be immediately available to 
me. The reason why I can respond to my opponent is because the opponent’s movement is 
experienced as directed towards me from the very first moment of seeing the movement. Hence, the 
no-self doctrine described in the Nikāyas does not accurately capture the experience of accomplished 
martial artists. We need to provide a different no-self view that, nevertheless, can explain the 
availability of the contents of their experience to themselves. 
 
 
Self-Awareness and the First-Personal Givenness 
 
In analysing the phenomenology of martial artists, we have, so far, focused on the object-directed 
nature of our conscious experience. Insofar as it is an experience of objects, the experience that a 
martial artist has is, in some sense, ‘given’ to them. My experience of the opponent striking me, for 
example, is not necessarily a result of the free creation of the mind. The opponent’s movement must 
be experientially ‘given’ to me for it to count as my experience of the opponent, even though the 
experience may not be completely veridical with respect to what is, in fact, in front of me. 
As Zahavi (2005) and other phenomenologists also emphasise, an experience of objects must 
be more than this. If it were not, my experience of the opponent as I stand in front of her or him 
would be exactly the same as your experience of it if we were to be in the same circumstance. The 
‘external’ situation involving the opponent just ‘gives’ us the same contents of experiences. 
Assuming that it is the same situation we are experiencing, we would then have to conclude that our 
experiences are exactly the same. This would mean that we could not talk about ‘what it is like’ to be 
faced with a fierce opponent in the way that would explain the differences of our experiences. 
Depending on the level of accomplishment, however, we may experience an opening for counter-
strike or a feeling of defeat as advanced martial artists can testify. So, we must assume that we bring 
something to the experienced object or situation. That is, that which is given to us must be ‘coloured’ 
by what we bring to it. What colours the content of experience may be thoughts, beliefs, ideas, 
feelings and volitions, giving some quality to the object or situation that is experienced. They may 
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also be physical such as bodily sensations. Pain in my ankle may add more physical and 
psychological discomfort to my experience of being struck, for example. 
So, our experiences must have at least two aspects. On the one hand, there must be a passive 
aspect: the givenness of the object experienced. On the other hand, there must be an active aspect: 
the bringing of something to that which is ‘given’. An experience is where these two aspects are 
tightly interconnected. It is because of the enmeshment of these two aspects that an object appears to 
us in the way it does. As Zahavi puts it: 
 
Phenomenology pays attention to the givenness of the object, but it does not simply focus on 
the object exactly as it is given; it also focuses on the subjective side of consciousness, 
thereby illuminating our subjective accomplishments and the intentionality that is at play in 
order for the object to appear as it does. When we investigate appearing objects, we also 
disclose ourselves as datives of manifestation, as those to whom objects appear. (p. 123) 
 
That is, experience is where an object becomes available to the subject of experience, and, thus, an 
investigation of experienced objects necessarily involves a disclosure of the subject.12 
Zahavi characterises the enmeshment of the passivity and activity of experiences in terms of 
the first-personal givenness. As he writes: 
 
This first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena is not something incidental to their 
being, a mere varnish that the experiences could lack without ceasing to be experiences. On 
the contrary, this first-personal givenness makes the experiences subjective. To put it another 
way, their first-personal givenness entails a built-in self-reference, a primitive experiential 
self-referentiality. (p. 122) 
 
According to Zahavi, the reason why my experience is available to me is because my experience is 
something that is first-personally given to me. It is because of this first-personal givenness that some 
experiences can be said to be my experiences. In order to capture this aspect of experiences, Zahavi 
characterises them in terms of the reflexive nature of experiences. 
To understand experiences in this way is to think of my experience as individuated simply 
because it is my experience. When I see the movement of the opponent, I wouldn’t experience it as 
someone else’s experience. It is experienced as my experience. This minimum sense of mineness is 
what Zahavi calls the self. Thus, for Zahavi, the self is not something that stands in an external 
relation to experience. The self is just mineness that is integral to the structure of experiences that 
can be revealed from a first-person perspective.13 
It is important to recognise that, on this view, self-awareness is not an awareness of the self. 
‘I’ is not something that is added to what is first-personally given. Rather, it is the structure of 
awareness that reveals what is available for the subject of experience. In this sense, self-awareness 
can be understood as ‘world-immersed’-self-awareness. As Zahavi writes: 
 
[S]elf-awareness is not to be understood as an awareness of an isolated worldless self, nor is 
the self located and hidden in the head. To be self-aware is not to interrupt the experiential 
interaction with the world in order to turn to gaze inward; on the contrary, self-awareness is 
always the self-awareness of a world-immersed self. The self is present to itself precisely and 
indeed only when worldly engaged. (pp. 125-126) 
 
This is why my awareness of the opponent’s movement is also my self-awareness which makes 
possible for me, and not anyone else, to respond instantaneously. 
Zahavi uses this minimum notion of the self as forming an argument for the reality of the 
self. He rhetorically asks: 
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Why not rather insist that the self is real if it has experiential reality and that the validity of 
our account of the self is to be measured by its ability to be faithful to experience, by its 
ability to capture and articulate (invariant) experiential structures? (p. 128) 
 
The advocates of the no-self doctrine do not necessarily have to reject the world-immersed nature of 
awareness as we will see in the next section. What they would have to object to is calling the 
minimum sense of mineness the self.14 For what we should reserve the word ‘self’, however, seems 
to be just a semantic question and no significance can come out of debating on the question. What is 
important is understanding the nature of self-awareness and its relation to selfhood understood in this 
minimum sense. 
If we follow Zahavi and understand the self in terms of the first-personal giveness of 
experiences, then the self does not seem to get in the way of responding to the opponent for martial 
artists. If anything, it is because the experience is mine and immediately available for me to respond 
that I can instantaneously react to the opponent’s movement. Instead of getting in the way of 
responding, self-awareness seems to be what enables martial artists to respond. However, does this 
mean that self-awareness is an unproblematic notion for martial artists? As we will see in the next 
section, Dōgen has a warning about self-awareness and it is exactly this warning that Takuan can be 
thought of as offering to the martial arts. 
 
 
The Exertion of the Self 
 
In order to understand the kind of experience that becomes problematic for martial artists, let’s 
reconsider the two aspects of experiences that we discussed before. We have seen that experiences 
can be characterised in terms of their passivity and activity. My experience of facing an opponent is, 
on the one hand, passive in the sense that the opponent’s movement must be ‘given’ to me. On the 
other hand, it is active in the sense that there must be something that is added to the ‘given’. It is 
because of this active element that the experience is my experience. But what is added to the ‘given’ 
in order for the experience to be of a certain quality comes in degrees. In facing the opponent’s 
movement, a number of psycho-physical elements must come together to form an experience. 
Depending on the degree of fear I have in facing a superior opponent, I may experience uneasiness 
or terror. When pain in my ankle in the form of bodily sensations asserts itself, my experience may 
be of discomfort or anguish. So what contributes to the particular quality of experience depends on 
not just what qualities make up experience but also the degree to which each quality is brought to the 
surface. 
In some situation, some elements may be forcefully exerted in order to have certain 
experiences. For example, the thought that “I see an opening, now is the time to counter-strike!” may 
form my experience of seeing the opponent’s movement. Such a thought can allow me to experience 
the opponent’s movement as an attack, rather than a trick, which needs to be responded. Given that I 
can respond to the attack only if I see the movement as an attack rather than simple forward 
movement, I may forcefully bring the thought of counter-striking into play so that I can parry the 
opponent’s strike. In such a situation, responding to the opponent becomes possible by the presence 
of the self that forms the thought. Because of the self in addition to what is given to me, however, the 
experience is of myself counter-striking the opponent. As Takuan tells us, when we forcefully bring 
ourselves to the situation in order to respond, our mind is caught by the self of which we are aware 
and, as a result, we are unable to respond to the opponent in time. 
According to Dōgen, such an exerted self is the result of striving to achieve an end. We want 
to put ourselves in a certain situation by means of action. When a self is brought to bear in order to 
counter-strike, however, we are (phenomenologically) carrying ourselves forwards in responding to 
the opponent’s movement. In carrying ourselves forwards in order to achieve an end, the self is 
brought above what is first-personally given. An awareness of the opponent’s movement then 
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becomes an awareness of ourselves being about to be struck. Such awareness creates a distance 
between what is first-personally given and the self of which we are aware, since the self is brought 
into play over and above what is first-personally given.15 In order to be able to respond immediately, 
however, we need to put our mind to what is right in front of us and let it form our experience. As 
Dōgen puts it:  
 
Carrying the self forward to verify-in-practice the myriad things is delusion; for the myriad 
things to come forth and verify-in-practice the self is enlightenment. (Genjōkōan: 4)16 
 
Once the self is forcefully brought into play over and above what is first-personally given, we 
become unable to respond immediately to the opponent’s movement. It is this self that the martial 
artists must ‘forget’. By paraphrasing Dōgen: 
 
To study the way of martial arts is to study the self. To study the self is to forget the self. To 
forget the self is to be verified by the myriad things [of the world].17 
 
By forgetting the self, nothing arises above what is first-personally given. It is when the self is not 
exercised as a means to end that a martial artist can have immediate engagement with the world 
without any mediation by the self. Martial artists must be self-aware in the sense that their 
engagement with the situation must be immediately available to them. Yet, they must not be aware of 




Self-Awareness, the Self and Martial Arts 
 
Who’s there when I am faced with an opponent? There is the opponent, of course. But there is also 
me since that is what it is for me to respond. From the point of view of some Buddhists, such answer 
may appear to be problematic because of their adherence to the no-self doctrine. However, that there 
is a subject responding to the opponent is just a fact for the martial artists. There is nothing but me to 
get out of the situation that the opponent has forced me into. 
Faced with an opponent who is about to strike me, I can respond by thinking to myself: “I see 
an opening, now is the time to counter-strike!'” According to Dōgen, responding in this way involves 
the self in terms of which I could respond. We can think of Takuan as following Dōgen and urges the 
martial artists not to respond to their opponents in that way. The ‘I’ that is exerted over the first-
personally given in order to experience my opponent’s attack and to control my movement in 
response is problematic. It is the instrumentally exerted self over and above the first-personally given 
experience that Takuan identifies as problematic. 
Now, Damasio has claimed that when I am aware of an object, I necessarily have the sense of 
the self. He has argued that it is pathological not to be self-aware when I experience an object. If we 
understood his claim to be that I must be aware of myself in order to have an experience of the 
object, then the experiences of the martial artists might be thought to be counter-examples to 
Damasio’s claim. Takuan urges the martial artists to disengage from such experiences. 
Damasio’s claim can be understood differently, however. Damasio argues for the necessity of 
self-awareness. However, he does not argue, as far as I am aware, that the awareness of the self is 
what allows us to have experiences at all. All he argues is that it is pathological for me to have an 
experience as someone else’s experience, or not as my experience. In other words, as Zahavi argues, 
if my experience does not have the reflexive structure allowing its content to become available to 
me, I cannot be said to have experiences at all. Takuan doesn’t deny this. He does not urge the 
martial artists not to experience the opponent’s movement as their experience. In fact, it is the self-
awareness as understood by Damasio and Zahavi that makes them possible to respond. Hence, 
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Damasio’s claim can hardly pose a problem in characterising the martial artists’ experiences as 
conscious experiences if we understand their experiences from the perspectives of Dōgen and 
Takuan.18 What the martial artist must not do, according to Takuan, is forcefully bring the self into 
play in order to respond. In other words, Takuan identifies the instrumental notion of selfhood as 
problematic for the martial artists. Martial artists must be self-aware without being aware of 
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  I use the phrase ‘martial artists’ with some reservation. The phenomena with which I am concerned in this 
paper are more salient in tennis, cricket and soccer than in tai chi, for example. Nonetheless, I talk about 
kendō players as ‘martial artists’ in general for convenience even though I do not suggest that my discussion is 
applicable to all or only forms of martial arts.	  4	  Translations of Takuan’s writings contained in this paper are mine. An alternative English translation can be 
found in Wilson (1986).	  5	  Phenomenology of sports players has been discussed by, for example, Breivik (2013) and Dreyfus (2002). 
Their discussions focus on representation and deliberation that may or may not be involved in sporting 
activities rather than self-awareness and no-self.	  6	  Several contemporary Western philosophers of mind have also advocated no-self views and they have 
explained the kind of consciousness that does not involve the self in terms of such views. See, for example, 
Dennett (1991) and Metzinger (2003).	  7	  An English translation can be found in Bodhi (2000) pp. 901-902.	  8	  An English translation can be found in Horner (1969) p. 37. For an analysis of the Milindapañhā, see for 
example Siderits (2003) ch. 3.	  9	  An English translation can be found in Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi (2001) p. 123.	  10	  I own this analysis to Albahari (2006) which contains an excellent discussion of the issues of self-
awareness and the self from the perspective of the Nikāyas (although the position on consciousness and the 
self she develops in the end is something that I do not recognise as Buddhist nor do I agree on). See, in 
particular, Albahari (2006) ch. 3.	  11	  The Nikāyas contain several passages presenting arguments of this kind in terms of impermanent nature of 
experiences. See, for example, the Nandakovāda Sutta in the Majjhima Nikāya. An English translation can be 
found in Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi (2001) pp. 1120-1125.	  12	  This is also the way that Arnold (2008) characterises the Buddhist notion of svasaṃvitti or svasaṃvedana 
developed by the Buddhist epistemologists/logicians Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. I have left out an analysis of 
svasaṃvedana as it is a controversial issue among Buddhist scholars. I have, instead, appealed to the 
phenomenological investigation by Zahavi to bring out an element of experience that is important for the 
martial artists.	  13	  See Zahavi (2005): 124ff.	  14	  See, for example, Albahari (2011) who, while accepting most of Zahavi’s notion of self-awareness, argues 
against Zahavi’s claim about the reality of the self.	  15	  We can think of this distance as the subject/object duality that is often emphasised in the Yogācāra school 
of Buddhist philosophy. 16	  This translation is from Davis (2009). For a commentary emphasising the notion of the self, see Davis 
(2011). In this passage, Dōgen is rejecting the instrumental nature of practice according to which practice is 
instrumental in bringing about enlightenment. For a discussion of this point, see Finnigan (forthcoming).	  
17 What Dōgen says is the following: “To study the Buddha Way is to study the self. To study the self is to 
forget the self. To forget the self is to be verified by the myriad things [of the world].” (Genjōkōan: 6) This 
translation is from Davis (2009). 18	  Given that one crucial element of Madhyamaka ethics is the breaking down of the ‘barrier’ between my 
experience and everyone else’s, the Mādhyamika might have a problem with Damasio’s thesis. I let the 
Mādhyamika provide a different treatment of Damasio’s thesis.	  
